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I.  Introduction 
Economists  have  long  recognized that the performance of  a 
market  depends  upon  the  status  of  potential  competition  from 
firms  outside  the  market,  as  well  as  the  conduct  of  established 
firms.  John  Bates  Clark  stressed  this  point  for  markets 
dominated by  a  monopolist as early as 1887.  Joe  Bain  expanded 
Clark's  work  to  cover  other  types  of  market  structure, 
effectively  introducing  the  potential  competition  concept  to  the 
empirical  analysis  of  market  performance.  Bain  defined  entry  as 
the addition of new productive capacity to a  market by a  new  firm 
(Bain,  1956,  p.  5).  According  to Bain the condition of entry is 
a  function  of  the height  of barriers to entry  and  the shape  of 
the  queue  of  potential  entrants.  The  condition  of  entry 
determines  and  is  measurab le  by  the  1 imi  t  pr ice,  i.e.  the  amount 
that  price  can  be  raised  above  minimum  long  run  average  cost 
without attracting entry.  Empirical  testing  of  the  effect of 
potential competition has  focused  almost exclusively upon  the 
impact  of  barriers  to  entry  on  actual  prices  and  profits  in 
markets  (Bain,  1956;  Mann,  1966;  Scherer,  1980).  Notable 
exceptions  are  Orr  (1974),  Duetsch  (1975)  and  yip  (1982),  and 
more  recently  Geroski  and  Masson  (1987)  and  Bresnahan  and  Reiss 
(1987). 
Recognizing  that  an  analysis  of  entry  by  merger  is 
complicated  by  mu~ti-market  acquisitions  and  by  acquisitions  of 
leading  firms  in  some  markets,  we  analyze only de  novo  entry. 
1 For  ease of exposition,  this  term  is shortened to entry in this 
paper. 
Analyzing  entry behavior  is  important  not  only  for  improving 
strategic decision  making  in  an  industry but also  for  evaluating 
the  relaxation  of  antitrust  enforcement  towards  mergers.  In 
recent  cases  the  Justice  Department  and  Federal  Trade  Commission 
have  approved  large mergers  because  they  believe that entry  into 
markets  is  relatively  easy,  i.e.  that  there  are  many  viable 
potential  competitors  (see,  for  example  FTC,  1983,  p.  49). 
Specifically with  regard  to  merger  enforcement policy  in  food 
retailing,  the  FTC's  recent  decisions  ignore  empirical  documenta-
tion  that  retailers with  large  market  shares  in  concentrated 
mar k e t sex  e r cis  e  mar k e t  power  ( Mar ion eta  1 .,  1 9 7 9;  La  mm,  1 9 8 1 ; 
and  Cotterill,  1986). 
Research  on  entry addresses  the  market  power  question  from  a 
more  dynamic  perspective  than  traditional  market  structure-
performance  studies,  and  thus  provides  new  insights.  Bain 
distinguished  between  concentrated  markets  wi th  effecti  vely  and 
ineffectively  impeded  entry.  Firms  may  exercise  market  power  in 
both,  but in the latter, one would observe entry since  long  run 
profits  are  maximized  by  raising  price  above  the  entry 
forestalling  level and  attracting entry. 
Although  the  empirical  results reported  here are  for  the 
food  retailing  industry,  they  have  broader  significance  for  four 
reasons.  First,  to  paraphase  Bresnahan  and  Reiss  (1987,  p.  834), 
in  contrast  to  most  entry  studies  that  use  aggregate  cross-
section  data  on  different  manufacturing  industries  (for  example, 
2 autos  and  frozen  french  fries)  we  are  analyzing  one  industry  that 
operates  in  several  local  markets.  Since  all  firms  in  the 
industry  face  similar  technological  opportunities,  regulations, 
general  cost  and  demand  conditions,  this  study  is  subject  to  less 
specification  error  and  random  noise. 
Secondly,  this  is  the  first  study  that  operationalizes  and 
tests Bainl s  thoughts on  the impact of the shape of the queue of 
potential  entrants  upon  entry.  Only  Hines  (1957)  and  more 
recently the business strategists,  including  Yip  (1982),  have 
suggested  that  the  queue  of  potential  entrants  is  not  perfectly 
elastic at  the  limit price. 
Third,  this  study  employs  strategic  group  theory  to  specify 
and test a  model  that conforms  more closely to actual  industry 
structure  and  conduct  than  is possible  in  more  aggregated  studies 
of  manufacturing  industries. 
Fourth,  following  the  work  of  Orr  and  Yip,  this  study 
analyzes  entry  unadjusted  for  exits.  Studies  that  focus  upon  net 
entry  (e.g.,  Duetsch,  1975)  ignore the fact  that entry  and  exit 
are  not  symmetric.  The  market  structure and  strategies  conducive 
to  entry  can  be  very  different  from  those  associated  with  exit. 
In  the following  section we  develop  measures  of  Bainls  queue 
of  potential  entrants  for  the  grocery  industry.  In  section  three 
we  specify  a  simultaneous  equations  model  that  predicts  industry 
price  levels as  well  as  entry.  Solving  the model  for  the reduced 
form equation for entry produces  the model  that is empirically 
tested  in  section  four.  Section  five contains  conclusions. 
3 II.  Operationalizing  Bain's  Queue  of  Potential  Entrants  Theory 
Hines  (1957)  first  analyzed  the  shape  of  the  queue  of 
potential  entrants  arguing  that  established  firms  not  in  the 
market  are  more  likely potential  entrants  than  new  firms 
organized  from scratch.  Work  by  the business strategists,  most 
notably Porter and  Yip,  on strategic groups provides further  a 
priori  guidance  on  the  shape  of  the  queue.  Yip  argues  that  firms 
in  most  markets  can  be  classified  into  two  major  strategic 
groups,  core  and  fringe.  With  regard  to  entry  he  states: 
Frequent  entry  of  minor  competitors  does  not  indicate 
low  barriers  for  firms  wishing  to  become  major 
competitors.  Easy  entry into  an  industry's  fringe 
may  have  little effect on  the  forces  of competition  in 
the core of the industry  (Yip,  1982,  p.  27). 
Shapiro  and  Khemani's  study  of  de  novo  entry  in  Canadian 
manufacturing  substantiates  this  point.  They  found  that  de  novo 
entrants  tended  to  be  small  single plant  firms  and  that  they 
replaced other small  single plant firms  (Shapiro  and  Khemani, 
1987,  p.  25). 
Since core  firm  conduct  is  the  primary  determinant  of  market 
performance,  strategic group  theory  suggests  that  fringe  entry  is 
irrelevant.  For  the  grocery  industry,  therefore,  one  cannot 
consider  the  opening  of  independent  supermarkets  or  smaller  food 
stores  to  be  effective entry.  Small  operators have small  and 
inconsequential impacts.  Moreover,  when  enter  ing  the  core  of  an 
industry,  Berry suggests that large firms  are  less deterred by 
entry barriers  than  small  firms  (Berry,  1975,  p.  25).  Thus  we 
identify  the  top  twenty  food  retailing  chains  in  1972  as  candi-
dates  for  most  likely potential entrant status.  We  pick  1972 
4 because  our  data  set monitors  entry  between  1972  and  1981.  From 
the  standpoint  of  cost  efficiency  each  of  the  top  twenty  is 
large  enough  to  attain  size  advantages  in  vertical  distribution, 
commodity  procurement,  in-house  manufacturing  and  private  label 
programs  (Cotterill,  1977,  p.  1(38).  Also,  few  other  firms 
possess  their  combination  of  supermarket  management  skills, 
financial  resources,  and  new  store  start-up  ability  (site 
procurement,  new  store  des  i gn,  and  who 1 esa  1 i ng  suppor t) .  These 
capabilities strongly suggest  that  large  food  chains  are  not  only 
able  to  enter  a  market  but also are  able  to  become  a  competitive 
factor  and  influence  the  conduct  of  leading  firms  in  the market. 
Geographical proximity to a  target determines  which  large 
food  chains  are  the  most  likely potential  entrants.  A  chain  may 
find  it easier  to  enter  a  nearby  market  because  it  (1)  may  be 
able  to  service  the  new  market  from  existing  distribution 
centers,  (2)  may  be relatively well  known  by  potential  customers, 
(3)  may  be  able  to  use  some  of  its  knowledge  about  regional 
tastes  and  preferences  or  (4)  may  be  able  to  hire  or  transfer 
higher  quality managers  to  a  nearby market  more  cost effectively. 
To  measure  the effect  of  potential  competition  we  employ 
three  alternative  potential 
developed in the next section. 
binary  variable  with  value 
entrant  variables  in  the  model 
Potential entrant  (POT21313)  is a 
1  if  one  or  more  large  chains 
currently not in a  market has  a  distribution center within  21313 
miles  of  the  market.  Variable  radius  potential  entrant  (POTVAR) 
allows  the  radius  to  vary  in  different  parts  of  the  country  when 
defining  the  binary  entrant  variable.  This  recognizes  the  fact 
5 that  population density  varies  and  that  in  more  densely populated 
areas a  potential entrant's distribution center must  be closer 
than  200  miles  to  compete  effectively  with  established  firms.l/ 
The  third  measure  of  potential  competition  is  the  number  of 
potential  entrants  (NUMPOT)  within  striking  distance,  as  defined 
by  the  variable  radius  measure  defined  above. 
III.  Model  Specification 
Orr  (1974)  first  attempted  to  operationalize  Bain's  model  of 
entry.  In  his  work,  entry  during  a  four  year  period  is  a 
function of  the difference between actual profits from  a  prior 
four  year  period  and  the  long  run  entry  limiting profit  level  in 
the  current  period.  Orr  considered  lagged  actual  profits  to  be 
exogenous.  Recently  Gersoski  and  Masson  endogenized  lagged 
actual profits in a  dynamic model of entry, profits and change in 
four  firm  concentration  (Gersoski  and  Masson,  1987).  Here  we 
endogenize  lagged actual profits and  entry in  a  long  run  model 
that is not explicitly dynamic,  Le.  we  do  not model  the impact 
of  entry  on  four  firm  concentration.  Although  this  approach 
doesn't allow us  to analyze how  the market adjusts to entry, it 
does  identify the  relationship between  entry  and  the  condition of 
1/  It  is  constructed  as  follows.  Binary  potential  entrant 
variables,  defined  using  different distances,  were  tried  for 
each  of  five  major  region  of  the  country  to  determine  which 
distance  had  the  greatest explanatory  power  for  that  region. 
POTVAR  is  constructed  using  the best fitting  radius  for  each 
region. 
6 entry  (barriers  and  queue  effects) .2/  Equations  1-3  below 
specify  our  structural  model  and  equation  4  is  the  reduced  form 
equation  for  entry  that  we  estimate.  Explanatory  variables  and 
the  hypothesized  signs  for  each  are  explained  below. 
1)  Entry  =  y  (1T  A - 1T  L) 
y  > 0 
2)  1T  A  =  ex  0  + ex 1  GRCW  + ex 2  CONC 
3)  1T  L =  80  + 81  POTENT  + 8 2  GRaV  + 8 3  SGRATIO  + 84  CONe  + 85  NFC  + 86  MSIZE 
81 <0  8 2 <0  8 3 >0  84 >0  85 >086 >0 
4)  Entry =  y  ( ex 0  - 8 0)  +  (- y  8 1)  POTENT  +  y (ex 1  - ( 2)  GROO  +  (-y  8 3)  SGRATIO 
> 0  > 0 
+  y( ex  2 - 8  4)  CONe  +  (-y ( 5)  NFC  +  (-y  ( 6)  MSIZE 
< 0 
> 




Entry  is  a  binary  variable with  value  1  if  an  entry 
occurs between 1972 and 1981,  0  otherwise.  Each  occurence 
of  entry  in  a  market  is  recorded  as  a  separate  observation, 
i.e.,  there is 1  observation per market with  no  entry and  x 
observations  for  each  market  with  entry,  where  x  = number  of 
new  entrants. 
1T  A  is  actual profit  (price)  level  in  the  market. 
The  time  lag  between  entry  and  subsequent  changes  in 
concentration  suggest  that  in  fact  changes  in  concentration 
resulting  from  entry  are  not  simultaneously  determined  with 
the  profit  levels  that  determine  whether  entry  occurs. 
Moreover,  in Gersoski  and  Masson's  relatively rapid model  it 
takes  155  years  for  concentration  to  adjust  and  for  profits 
to converge to their long  run  norms.  They  find it "hard  to 
take  est  ima tes  1 ike  this  too  ser  ious  1 y"  (Geroski  &  Masson, 
1987,  p.  10).  Clearly there is room for alternative model 
specifications. 
7 TIL  is  the  limit profit  (price)  level  in  the market. 
POTENT  is  one  of  the  three  measures  of  the  shape  of  queue  of 
potential  entrants  developed  in  the  prior  section:  POT200, 
POTVAR,  or  NUMPOT. 
GROW  is  the percent  growth  in grocery store sales between 
19 67  and  1 9 7 2. 
SGRATIO  is the ratio of supermarket to grocery store sales 
in 1972. 
CONC  is  the  four  firm  grocery  sales  ratio  or  grocery 
Hirschman-Herfindahl  Index  (HHI)  or  four  firm supermarket 
sales  concentration  ratio  in  1972. 
NFC  is  the  number  of  large  food  chains  in  the  market  in 
1972. 
MSIZE  is  the size of  the market measured  by total grocery 
sales  in  1972. 
POTENT,  however  measured,  is hypothesized  to  have  a  positive 
effect  on  entry. 
GROWTH  also  has  a  positive  impact  on  entry.  Rapidly growing 
markets  increase  estab  1 i shed  firms'  prof  i tab iIi  ty  and  reduce  the 
displacement  effect  associated  with  entry.  Entrants  can  gain  a 
share of the market without reducing  the dollar sales value of 
established  firms. 3/ 
SGRATIO  measures  the  extent  of  supermarket  penetration  in  a 
market,  and as such identifies whether  the key strategic group, 
supermarkets,  is  full  or  has  space  for  new  supermarket 
3/  See  Marion  (1986)  for  an  numerical  illustration  of  the 
displacement effect  in  grocery  retailing  and  the  resulting 
incentives for established firms  to deter entry in highly 
concentrated  markets. 
8 operators.il  It  is  hypothesized  to  be  negatively  related  to 
entry,  i.e.,  if supermarket penetration is high  in  a  market,  it 
will  be  harder  for  a  supermarket chain  to enter the market  and 
less entry will,  ceteris  p~ribus,  occur. 
CONC,  however  measured,  affects  entry  in  two  ways.  As 
concentration increases, actual profitability in the market is 
likely to  increase,  making  entry more attractive;  however  the 
limit  profit  rate  also  is  hypothesized  to  increase  because 
structural  and  strategic  entry  barriers  are  related  to  high 
concentration.51  Therefore  the  reduced  form  relationship  between 
concentration  and  entry  depends  upon  whether  entry  is,  in  Bain's 
terms,  effectively  or  ineffectively  impeded.  In  the  former  case 
one  would  observe  a  negative  relationship;  in  the  latter one 
would  observe  a  positive relationship. 
NFC  measures  the  height  of  strategic barriers  to  entry  that 
are  associated  with  the  size  and  multimarket  operations  of large 
food  chains.  Rhoades  (1973),  Salop  (1979),  and  Encaoua et  ale 
(1986),  inter alia,  note that large multimarket firms  can  make 
credible threats  that deter  entry if they  react  in  a  punitive 
fashion  when  entry  occurs.  Using  cash  from  other  markets,  large 
41  Classifying all supermarkets  in  a  single strategic group 
oversimplifies the structure of  the grocery  industry,  but 
this  variable does  capture a  major  distinction between  small 
and  large store formats.  See Cotterill and Haller  (1986) 
for  a  explanation  of  strategic groups  within  the supermarket 
submarket. 
51  See  Cotteri 11  and  Hal,ler  (1986)  and  Marion  (1986)  for  an 
extended  discussion  of  entry barriers  in  food  retailing. 
9 food  chains  can  cross-subsidize  stepped  up  promotions  and/or  zone 
pricing  schemes  that  lower  prices  in  stores  surrounding  the 
entrant's store.  This  type  of behavior  has been documented  in 
case  studies  (FTC,  1969).  Therefore  we  expect  NFC  to  be 
negatively  related to entry. 
MSIZE  is  the  size  of  the  grocery market.  To  the  extent  that 
it is  more  difficult  to  enter  large  markets,  possibly  due  to  the 
size  of  the  investment  necessary  to  attain  a  given  market  share 
level,  one  would  expect it to  be  negatively related  to entry. 
IV.  Empirical  Results 
Metro  Market's  Grocery  Distribution  Guide  for  each  year 
between  1972  and  1982,  the  1967,  and  1972  Census  of  Retail  Trade, 
and  Parker  (1986)  provided most  of  the data  used  in this study. 
We  also  used  trade publications, including  Weekly  Food  Digest  and 
Supermarket News.  In  1972,  the  U.  S.  Census  Bureau  reported  on 
retail  food  operations  in  263  SMAs.  This  study examines  129  SMAs 
that  have  all  the  data  needed  and  are  well  defined  grocery 
markets.  6/  Since  some  markets  were  entered  by  more  than  one 
large chain  there  are  145  observations  in  the  sample. 
Table  1  provides  descriptive  statistics.  SMA's  in  the 
sample  are  somewhat  larger  than  the  average  size  of  all  SMA's  in 
6/  The  sample  does  not  include  53  SMA's  that  are  not  in  the 
1972  Grocery Distribution Guide,  28  new  SMA's  that do  not 
have  1967  sales  data  necessary  for  computing  market  growth 
rates,  the  26  New  England  SMA's  because  of  poor 
correspondence  between  economic  markets,  SMA's  and  Metro 
Market's  market  areas,  21  SMA's  that  experienced  major 
boundary  changes  between  1967-1972,  and  6  other  SMA's 
because  of  data  or  measurement  problems. 
10 Table  1.  Descriptive Statistics for  Variables  Used  in  the 
Analysis  of  Entry  by  Large  Grocery  Chains,  1972-1981. 
Variable  Name 
De  novo  entry 
Binary potential 
entrant 
(200  mile  radius) 
Binary potential 
entrant 
(variable  radius) 
Number  of  potential 
entrants 
(variable  radius) 
Market  growth, 









Supermarket  to  grocery  0.76 
sales  ratio,  1972 
Grocery  four-firm  49.53 
concentration  ratio, 
1972  (percent) 
Supermarket  four-firm  65.06 
concentration  ratio, 
1972  (percent) 
Hirschman-Herfindahl  894.08 
index,  1972 
Number  of  large 
grocery  chains, 
1972 
Market  size,  1972 
(Million  $) 
3.03 
373.184 


































76.532  3,233.751 1972,  263  mi llion dollars  (U.S.  Census).  The  sample averages, 
however,  closely  approximate  the  population  parameters  for 
grocery  four-firm  concentration,  (population  average  =  52.4 
percent)  and  for  supermarket  four-firm  concentration  (population 
average  = 69.5  percent)  for all SMSAs  in  1972  (Marion,  et al., 
1979,  p.  220). 
Since  the  dependent  variable,  entry, 
logit  is  used  to  estimate  the  model. 
is  a  binary  variable, 
This  gives  the  added 
feature  that predicted  levels of  the entry variable represent the 
probability that entry will  occur. 
Table  2  presents  estimated coefficients and  accompanying 
statistics for alternative specifications of  the entry model. 
The  size  and  significance  levels of all estimated parameters 
using  the  binary potential entrant  variable based  upon  a  constant 
200  mile  radius  (POT200)  are  essentially  identical  to  those 
reported  in  Table  2.  Thus  they  are  not  reported  here.  Equations 
1  through  5,  and  7  through  9  use  a  binary  potential  entrant 
variable defined  by  choosing  the  best  fitting  radius  in  each 
geographical  area.  Our  five  regional  models  gave  the  following 
results:  the  Middle  Atlantic  and  Northeast  (one  region),  50 
miles;  the  Southeast  region  and  the East  of  the  Mississippi  River 
North  Central  region,  100  mi les;  the  Plains  and  Rocky  Mountains 
region  and  the  west  Coast  region,  200  miles.  Equation  6  uses 
NUMPOT  which  measures  the  number  of potential  entrants within  the 
appropriate  radius  for  SMAs  in different regions  of  the  country. 
In  equation  1,  the  potential  entrant  and  market  growth 
variables  are  positively  and  significantly  related,  at  the  one 
percent level, to entry as hypothesized.  If a  large  chain has a 
12 Table  2.  Logit Analysis of Entry by Large Food  Chains,  1972  - 1981 
Explanatory variab1esa 
Potential  Super- N\.lllVJer 
Entrant  market /  Super- of Large  Market 
Measure  Potential  Market  Groc  Sales  Grocery  market  Grocery  Grocery  Size 
Used  Entrant  Growth  Ratio  CR4  CR4  HHI  Chains  (Bi 11ons)  Intercept 
1.  POTVAR  2.5509  0.0598  -2.3267 
(32.65)**  (l3.60)**  (22.16)** 
2.  POTVAR  2.9004  0.06090  -10.6216  5.6028 
(32.66) **  (13.06)**  (9.90)**  (4.97)* 
3.  POTVAR  2.5654  0.0641  -0.034~  -0.7396 
(32.41)**  (15.10) **  (3.08)  (0.54) 
4.  POTVAR  2.5360  0.0614  -0.0103  -1.6858 
(32.37) **  (14.07)**  (0.40)  (2.30) 
tv) 
...... 
5.  POTVAR  2.5620  0.0634  -0.0010  -1.5106 
(32.17) **  (14.97) **  (2.98) +  (5.19) * 
6.  NUMPOr  1.5931  0.0594  -0.00102  -1.1991 
(23.00) **  (14.24)**  (2.96)+  (2.96)+ 
7.  POTVAR  2.8158  0.0601  -9.2750  -0.352~  5.69l3 
(29.30) **  (12.55)**  (6.93)**  (3.44)  (4.80)* 
8.  parVAR  2.7947  0.0599  -8.9295  -0.3339  -0.33  5.4914 
(28.72) **  (12.39)**  (6.21) *  (2.96)+  (0.19)  (4.39) * 
9.  POTVAR  2.7478  0.0605  -8.1080  -0.00023  -0.3302  -0.37  5.0738 
(27.53)**  (12.53) **  (4.04)*  (0.12)  (2.92) +  (0.23)  (3.39) + 
Note:  There are 145  observations  in the sample. 
a.  Nl.l1Ders  in parentheses below coefficients are Chi-square values. 
** = significant at the 1 percent level.  * = significant at the 5  percent level. 
+  = significant at the 10  percent level. distribution  center  within  the  regionally  estimated  radius  of  an 
SMA  then it is significantly more  likely for  the market  to  be 
entered.  Market  growth  also  is  related  in  a  strong positive 
fashion.  In  equation  2,  the  supermarket  grocery  store  sales 
ratio  is  negatively  related  to  entry  as  hypothesized  and 
significant  at  the  one  percent  level.  Entry  by  these  large 
supermarket  chains  is more  likely where  supermarkets  in toto, 
account for  a  smaller share of grocery sales.  Equations  3,  4, 
and  5  introduce  the  grocery  four-firm  (GCR4),  the  supermarket 
four-firm  (SCR4),  and  the  grocery  Hirschman-Herfindahl  (HHI) 
concentration measures  to the model,  respectively.  SGRATIO  and 
the  number  of  large  chains  (NFC)  are  not  included  in  these 
equations  because  they  are  collinear  with  these  alternative 
measures  of  market  structure.  All  concentration  variables  are 
negatively  related  to  entry,  and  GCR4  and  HHI  are  statistically 
significant at  the  ten percent  level.  Given  that several  studies 
have  documented  the  existence  of  a  positive relationship between 
concentration  and  prices/profits,  if  there  were  no  barriers  one 
would  expect  to  see positive and  significant coefficients for 
these  variables.  The  results  suggest  that  barriers  do  exist  and 
that  entry  is  effectively  impeded,  i.e.,  firms  in  highly 
concentrated markets price above competitive  levels but below  the 
limit  price. 
Equation  6  is  the  same  as  equation  5  except  that  the  number 
of  potential  entrants  (NUMPOT)  is  specified  to  measure  the  shape 
of  the  queue.  The  performance  of  the other  variables changes 
14 little and  the coefficient for  NUMPOT  is positive and  significant 
at the  one  percent  level. 
The  number  of  large  grocery  chains  is  introduced  with 
SGRATIO  in equation  7.  NFC  is negatively related to entry and 
significant  at  the  ten  percent  level.  Equation  8  introduces 
market size.  It has  the hypothesized  negative sign but  is not 
significant.  Equation 9  is identical to equation 8  except that 
the  grocery  HHI  is also  included.  Its sign  remains  negative,  but 
it is not significant.  Multicollinearity also reduces  the Chi 
square  value  for  SGRATIO  by  50  percent but  it remains  significant 
at the five percent  level. 
The  results  reported  in  Table  2  allow  us  to  compute  a 
predicted probability of  entry  for  any  market.  Using  equation  1, 
assuming that  there  are  one  or  more  potential  entrants  (POTVAR  = 
1),  and  that  growth  is  held  constant  at  its  mean  value,  the 
probability  of  entry  occurring  during  the  ten  year  1972-1981 
period  is  0.849.  If  there  are  no  potential  entrants,  the 
probabi lity  of  entry  drops  to  0.239.  using  equation  6  and 
assuming all other variables are at their mean  values,  when  there 
is  no  potential  entrant  the  probability  of  entry  is  0.306.  When 
there  is  one  it increases  to  0.684.  When  there  are  two  it is 
o  •  9 1 4;  and  w hen  the rea  r e  3  e n t ran  t sit is"  • 9.8 1 •  The s e 
probabilities  suggest  entry  is  ineffectively  impeded.  Yet  these 
are entry probabi lities for  a  ten year period.  As  Geroski  and 
Masson  report  entry still  may  not  provide  sufficient  discipline 
to  ensure  timely  adjustment  and  efficient  operation  of 
15 markets.  7/ Also the DOJ  merger guidelines consider entry to be 
effectively  impeded  if it is unlikely within  two  years.  Two  year 
probabilities  would  be  significantly  lower  than  those  estimated 
here.  Moreover,  these  probab i 1 i ties  are  computed  ho Idi  ng  other 
variables  constant  at  their  average  values.  The  probability  of 
entry  when  a  potential  entrant  is  present  is  significantly  lower 
in  markets  with  lower  growth,  higher  concentration,  large 
supermarket  share,  and  more  established  large  food  chains. 
Table  3  reports  the  sensitivity  of  the probability of  entry 
to  changes  in  other  market  structure  variables  by  evaluating  the 
partial  derivatives  of  equation  4  at  the  mean  for  each  variable. 
POTVAR  is held constant at  a  value of  1.  A  10  percentage point 
decrease  in  market  growth  decreases  the  probability  of  entry  by 
0.078.  Raising  the  ratio  of  food  sales  accounted  for  by 
supermarkets  by  10  percentage points  causes  a  0.136  point decline 
in  the  probability  of  entry.  When  the  grocery  four-firm  concen-
tration  ratio  increases  by  10  percentage  points,  the  probability 
of entry falls by  0.025.  An  increase  in  the grocery Hirschman-
Herfindahl  Index  of  100  points decreases  the probability of entry 
by  0.015.  Increasing  the  number  of  grocery chains  by  one  in  a 
market  decreases  the  probability  of  entry  by  0.047. 
V.  Conclusions 
Our  primary  conclusion  from  these  results  is  that  entry  is 
clearly related  to  market  structure.  This  is  the  first empirical 
study  that  includes  structural measures  of  the queue  of potential 
7/  See  footnote  2  supra. 
16 Table  3.  Partial Derivatives  of  the  probability  of  Entry 
Evaluated  at  the  Mean  Values  of  Market  structure 
Variablesa 
Market  structure 
Variable 
Market  growth 
Supermarket  / 
grocery  store 
sales  ratio 
Grocery  four-firm 
concentration  ratio 
Grocery  Hirschman-
Herfindahl  index 
Number  of  large 
grocery  chains 
Note:  Values  computed 
except  as  noted. 
from 
a.  POTVAR  held  constant at 
b.  Computed  from  equation 
c.  Computed  from  equation 








equation  2,  Table 
a  value  of  1. 
3,  Table  2. 
5,  Table  2. 
7,  Table  2. 
17 
Derivative  of 
Probability of  Entry 
0.0078 
-1. 36 
2, entrants as  well  as barriers  to entry,  and  it seems warranted. 
The shape of the queue of entry is the strongest determinant of 
entry.  The  probability  of  entry  more  than  doubles  if  there  is  a 
potential  entrant  within  striking  distance  of  a  market,  and 
striking distance varies  from  50  miles  in  the  Middle Atlantic  and 
Northeast  region  to  200  mi les  in  the  Plains,  Rocky  Mountains  and 
Pacific  coast  regions. 
This  research  also  suggests  that  barriers  to  entry  exist  in 
retail  food  markets.  Entry  barriers,  possibly  due  to  the 
displacement effect, appear to be higher  in  low growth markets. 
Although multicollinearity is a  problem,  barriers also  tend  to  be 
higher  in  markets  supplied primarily by  supermarkets,  in more 
concentrated markets,  and  in markets already supplied by  large 
food  chains. 
These  results  are  consistent  with  empirical  research  on 
concentration-profits  and  concentration-price  relationships  in 
food  retailing,  and  in  tandem  they  provide  strong  evidence  that 
retail food markets are not contestable.  strategic choices by 
firms  in  the  industry  and  antitrust  enforcement  by  public 
agencies must  be based  upon  a  careful  assessment  of  a  market's 
structure,  including  the condition of entry,  if they are to be 
effective. 
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